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Abstract
In this paper we study strategic formation of bilateral networks with
farsighted players in the classic framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
We use the largest consistent set (LCS)(Chwe (1994)) as the solution concept
for stability. We show that there exists a value function such that for every
component balanced and anonymous allocation rule, the corresponding LCS
does not contain any strongly eﬃcient network. Using Pareto eﬃciency, a
weaker concept of eﬃciency, we get a more positive result. However, then
also, at least one environment of networks (with a component balanced and
anonymous allocation rule) exists for which the largest consistent set does
not contain any Pareto eﬃcient network. These conﬁrm that the well-known
problem of the incompatibility between the set of stable networks and the
set of eﬃcient networks persists even in the environment with farsighted
players. Next we study some possibilities of resolving this incompatibility.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71, D20.
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A network is a representation of relations among agents/players in a society or
an economy. Formally, a network is a graph which describes the structure of
association among the agents. The agents are usually represented by the nodes
of the graph and an edge between two nodes represents the existence of some
well-deﬁned relation between the two corresponding agents. This relation can be
unilateral or bilateral. The corresponding structures of relationship are represented
by directed or non-directed networks respectively.
A network is a very powerful tool for describing and analyzing the structure
of association among agents as a rich pattern of cooperation among them can
be captured in this framework. Among the attractive features of this framework
for studying such cooperation, we can highlight that not only this framework is
capable of describing pay-oﬀ-externalities to a group owing to the formation of
other groups but also, it is capable of handling strength of association between
agents (see e.g., Bloch and Dutta, 2009; Page and Wooders, 2009). Naturally,
these attractive features have stimulated a spate of research in this area of studying
strategic network formation.2
This study is in the framework of strategic analysis of bilateral networks. A
player’s action is to form link(s) with other players or to sever existing link(s). In
this set-up, if a link is to be formed between two players, then consent from both
the players is necessary although a player can break a link unilaterally. The now
canonical model for analyses in this framework was introduced by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). In their model, the total pay-oﬀ to the players when a network
is formed is represented by a value function which assigns a real value to every
network. This value is distributed to the players according to some allocation
2See, e.g., the collection of papers in the book edited by Dutta and Jackson (2003) and the
survey by Jackson (2006).
2rule. For analyzing strategic formation of networks, they introduced the notion of
pairwise stability. One central result in their work showed that the set of stable
networks (with respect to the notion of pairwise stability) and the set of strongly
eﬃcient networks, those which are socially optimal, may be disjoint if the allocation
rules are intuitively nice.
This impossibility result was followed by a number of studies further exploring
this incompatibility between socially optimal states and stable states both within
the canonical Jackson-Wolinsky framework and in more speciﬁc economic models
(see, e.g., the survey by Jackson (2004)). Two important early works within the
Jackson-Wolinsky framework where this incompatibility were sought to be resolved
are Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Currarini and Morelli (2000). However,
Dutta and Mutuswami studied the strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a
network formation game. Therefore, either only myopic coalitional deviations or
only internal subcoalitional deviations were considered in their work. Currarini and
Morelli do not consider general coalitional moves and nor are the moves endogenous
in their model.
For sake of generalized analyses, one important issue is to study the strategic
formation of networks and the relation between stable and eﬃcient networks in
environments where the players are farsighted, any arbitrary coalition can make a
move and such coalitional moves are endogenous. Players are said to be farsighted
if they anticipate that any action by a group of players may generate a further chain
of actions by some other groups. They take this fact into account when computing
the ﬁnal pay-oﬀ resulting from their moves (in such models perfect information is
assumed). Dutta and Jackson (2003) were possibly the ﬁrst to emphasize the need
for such analyses.
“Perhaps the most important issue regarding modeling the forma-
tion of network is to develop fuller models of networks forming over
3time, and in particular allowing players who are farsighted. Farsighted-
ness would imply that players’ decisions on whether to form a network
are not based solely on current pay-oﬀs, but also where they expect
the process to go and possibly from emerging steady states or cycles in
network formation. ... It is conceivable that, at least in some contexts,
farsightedness may help in ensuring the eﬃciency of the stable state.”
(Dutta and Jackson in the “Introduction” of Dutta and Jackson (ed.) (2003),
emphasis in the original).
Such studies have emerged over the last few years. Dutta et al. (2005) looks at
a rich dynamic model of network formation with farsighted players. However, in
their model any arbitrary coalition is not allowed to form. In the study of Herings
et al. (2009) and Grandjean et al. (2009) only a pair of players is allowed to be
active at any stage. In a recent paper, Page and Wooders (2009), while allowing
several rules for network formation (including arbitrary coalitions to form and act),
do not look at the issue of the possible incompatibility between the socially optimal
states and the stable states in suﬃcient detail.
The present work is one attempt in this genre. However, we work with a solu-
tion notion already well-known and concentrate on the issue of the compatibility
between stability and eﬃciency.
For the present analysis we choose the largest consistent set (LCS) (Chwe
(1994)) as the set of stable networks. Several reasons drove this choice. First,
this solution concept has gained somewhat a canonical status in the literature on
coalitional behaviour with farsighted players. Not only is this set studied for speciﬁc
situations (see, e.g., Masuda, 2002; Suzuki and Muto, 2005), new solution notions
are also routinely compared with this solution (see, e.g., Herings et al., 2009). Sec-
ondly, this solution has nice analytical properties: for example, its non-emptiness
is ensured in the environment of networks. Moreover, it has been observed (and
4Chwe himself noted) that the LCS may be too inclusive. His motivation was:
“to deﬁne a weak concept, one which eliminates with conﬁdence....If
Y is consistent and a ∈ Y, the interpretation is not that a will be stable
but that it is possible for a to be stable. If an outcome b is not con-
tained in any consistent Y, the interpretation is that b cannot possibly
be stable: there is no consistent story in which b is stable.” (Chwe
(1994), italics in the original).
Therefore, it is interesting to check whether the above-mentioned incompati-
bility between the set of stable networks and the set of eﬃcient networks, those
which are socially optimal, still survives when the set of stable network becomes
avowedly inclusive enough.
We ﬁnd that in spite of the inclusive nature of the LCS, there exists a value
function such that for every component balanced and anonymous allocation rule,
the largest consistent set (with respect to the value function and the allocation
rule) does not contain any strongly eﬃcient network. This impossibility result pro-
vides another corroboration that the well-known incompatibility between stability
and eﬃciency of networks persists even when the players are farsighted. We also
show that there exists an environment of networks (with a component balanced
and anonymous allocation rule) such that the largest consistent set (with respect
to the value function and the allocation rule) does not contain any Pareto eﬃcient
network. Next, we study some possibilities of resolving this incompatibility.
Section 2 gives the preliminary deﬁnitions. The results are collected in Section
3. The proof of one of the propositions is given in the appendix.
52 Notation and the Preliminary Deﬁnitions
The framework and the basic tools for the present analysis were introduced by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Below we recall only the essential deﬁnitions for
completeness. For an elaborate explanation of these concepts and a number of
economic examples that ﬁt into this framework, we refer to the comprehensive
survey by Jackson (2004).
Networks
Let N be a ﬁnite set of players. Given S ⊆ N, by gS we denote the set of all
doubleton subsets of S. A bilateral network g on N is a subset of gN. The set of
all possible bilateral networks on N is denoted by Z. Given a non-empty network
g ∈ Z, an element {i,j} ∈ g (where i,j ∈ N) is a link between players i and j in
the network g. We shall often denote the link between i and j simply by ij. The
empty network (i.e., the network with no links) is denoted by ∅.
Players i and j have an indirect link between them in a network g if there exist
i0, i1,..., im in N such that i0 = i, im = j and for k = 0,..., m − 1, ikik+1 ∈ g.
Conventionally it is assumed that there is a link between each player and the player
itself. A network g induces a partition Π(g) of N where two distinct players i and
j are in the same element in the partition if and only if there exists an indirect
link between them. Given a network g and i ∈ N, by Πi(g) we denote the unique
element in Π(g) that contains the player i. The components of a network g,
C(g) = {g(S)|S ∈ Π(g)}
where g(S) = gS ∩ g.
Therefore, for any network g, g = ∪{g′| g′ is a component of g}.
Throughout this paper we denote the coalitions of players by S,T etc. and the
6networks by a,b,g,g′ etc..
Value Functions and Allocation Rules
A value function v : Z  → R assigns a real value to every g ∈ Z. This value is
generated by some underlying socio-economic process. We follow the standard
normalization that v(∅) = 0 and the value of a single player is also zero. The set
of all such value functions is denoted by V. Recall that given a network g, C(g)
denotes the set of the components of g. A value function is component-additive if






Given a value function v ∈ V, an allocation rule Y : Z ×V  → RN allocates the
value of a network to the players. Given a value function v ∈ V, an allocation rule
Y : Z × V  → RN induces a corresponding preference ordering  i (v,Y ) for each
i ∈ N on Z given as follows:
for g,g′ ∈ Z, g  i (v,Y )g
′ iﬀ Yi(g,v) ≥ Yi(g
′,v).
An allocation rule is component balanced if for any component additive value func-





where P(g′) is the set of players linked in the component g′ of g. Given a permuta-
tion π : N  → N, let vπ be deﬁned by vπ(g) = v(gπ−1) for each g ∈ Z. An allocation




7for each i ∈ N.
We recall the deﬁnitions of two allocation rules which will be useful later. An
allocation rule Y E is said to be egalitarian if for every v ∈ V and g ∈ Z, Y E
i (g,v) =
v(g)/|N|. Note that Y E is anonymous but not component balanced. Given any







where Ci is the component of g to which the player i belongs. Y CE splits the
value equally if the value function is not component additive. Note that Y CE is
component balanced as well as anonymous.
Eﬃcient Networks
Given a value function v, a network g ∈ Z is strongly eﬃcient if v(g) ≥ v(g′) for
all g′ ∈ Z.
A network g ∈ Z is Pareto eﬃcient relative to a value function v and an allocation
rule Y if there does not exist g′ ∈ Z such that Yi(g′,v) ≥ Yi(g,v) for all i ∈ N
with strict inequality for some i.
The Environment of Networks
An environment of social networks is represented by G = (N, Z, { i}i∈N, {→S
}S⊆N). Here  i is the preference relation for i ∈ N on Z (induced by some under-
lying value function and allocation rule). For each i ∈ N, a ib means that player
i weakly prefers network a to network b. The strict part of  i is denoted by ≻i .
The relation →S is the enforcement relation for S ⊆ N. For any a, b ∈ Z, a→Sb
implies that the coalition S can enforce network b from network a. Formally,
8Definition 1 (Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)) A coalition S can enforce
a network b from a network a if and only if
(i) a link ij ∈ b \ a implies that {i,j} ⊆ S and
(ii) a link ij ∈ a \ b implies that {i,j} ∩ S  = ∅.
For some coalition S and a, b ∈ Z, if a ≻i b for all i ∈ S then that is written
as a ≻S b.
Page and Wooders (2009) also deﬁned such a framework.
Indirect Domination and the Largest Consistent Set (LCS)
Below we give the deﬁnitions only. For the motivation and explanation of these
concepts we refer to Chwe (1994).
Definition 2 (Chwe (1994)) For a, b ∈ Z, b indirectly dominates a, denoted as
b ≫ a, if there exist a0, a1,..., am in Z and coalitions S0, S1,..., Sm−1 such
that a0 = a and am = b and for j = 0,..., m − 1,
(i) aj→Sjaj+1,
(ii) am ≻Sj aj.
Definition 3 (Chwe (1994)) A set Y ⊆ Z is said to be consistent if Y = {a ∈
Z| ∀(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ Y such that [e = d or e ≫ d]
and e  ≻S a}. The set L ⊆ Z is said to be the largest consistent set (LCS) if it is
consistent and it contains every consistent set.
By Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994), a non-empty LCS exists for every environment
of networks.
93 The Results
First we show an impossibility result which may be viewed as an exact analogue of
the impossibility result of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in the environment with
farsighted players.
Proposition 1 There exists a value function such that for every component bal-
anced and anonymous allocation rule, the largest consistent set (with respect to
the value function and the allocation rule) does not contain any strongly eﬃcient
network.
Proof: The proof is given in the appendix.
We discuss some implications of the result above in the form of the following
two remarks.
Remark 1 Results similar in spirit were obtained by Dutta et al. (2005) and
Herings et al. (2009) as well. Our result not only reinforce those, but also show
that even with an inclusive solution like the LCS, this incompatibility may persist.
The notions of stability used in these papers are quite diﬀerent from that for the
LCS. And of course, the notion of pairwise stability, being a concept relevant for
myopic players, is quite unrelated to the LCS as well.
Remark 2 Note that if we drop component balance as a requirement, then for
every value function, every strongly eﬃcient network is in the LCS with respect to
the egalitarian allocation rule Y E. In the next proposition we discuss the implica-
tion of dropping anonymity.
10By ¯ V we denote the class of value functions deﬁned as follows: ¯ V = {v ∈
V |v(g) > 0 if and only if g is not totally disconnected}. Dutta and Mutuswami
(1997) studied this class of value functions.
Proposition 2 There exists a component balanced allocation rule such that for
every v ∈ ¯ V , the largest consistent set (with respect to the value function and the
allocation rule) contains at least one strongly eﬃcient network.
Proof: Take a component additive value function v ∈ ¯ V . Fix g ∈ Z such that g
is strongly eﬃcient with respect to v. We shall deﬁne a component balanced (but
non-anonymous) allocation rule Y such that {g} is internally consistent (see the
Lemma in the proof of Proposition 1 (in the appendix) for the deﬁnition of internal
consistency) with respect to Y. Then, by the Lemma in the appendix we are done.
Case 1: Let there exist k ∈ N such that k has no link in g with any other player.
By the deﬁnition of ¯ V and component additivity, there exists at most one such k.
Take g′ ∈ Z \ {g}.
Subcase (a): If k is linked in some component hk ∈ C(g′) then Yk(g′,v) = v(hk) and
for every other player j ∈ Πk(g′), Yj(g′,v) = 0. For every h ∈ C(g′)\{hk} ﬁx some
ih ∈ N and set Yih(g′,v) = v(h). For every j ∈ N\({k}∪{ih ∈ N|h ∈ C(g′)\{hk}}),
Yj(g′,v) = 0.
Subcase (b): If k is not linked with any other player in g′ then for every h ∈ C(g′)
ﬁx some ih ∈ N and set Yih(g′,v) = v(h). For every j ∈ N \ {ih ∈ N|h ∈ C(g′)},
Yj(g′,v) = 0.
Case 2: Suppose g is such that every player is linked in g with at least one other
player. Take g′ ∈ Z \{g}. For every h ∈ C(g′) ﬁx some ih ∈ N and set Yih(g′,v) =
v(h). For every j ∈ N \ {ih ∈ N|h ∈ C(g′)}, Yj(g′,v) = 0.
And in both these cases, Yj(g,v) = Y CE
j (g,v). So, every player who is linked with
some other player in g gets a positive pay-oﬀ under Y.
11Now take S ⊆ N and g′ ∈ Z such that g′  = g and g→Sg′. Suppose we are in Case 1,
Subcase (a). Note that then S  = {k}. Let T = N\({k}∪{ih ∈ N|h ∈ C(g′)\{hk}}).




Now suppose we are in Case 1, Subcase (b). Then, again, S  = {k}. Let T =
N \ ({k} ∪ {ih ∈ N|h ∈ C(g′)}. Then, again, g indirectly dominates g′ according
to the following sequence of coalitional moves:
g
′→T∅→N\{k}g.
Thus, for Case 1, {g} is internally consistent.
Similarly, it can be shown that for Case 2 also, {g} is internally consistent.
An immediate and interesting question (in the spirit of Dutta and Mutuswami
(1997)) is whether Proposition 2 can be strengthened: i.e., whether we can ﬁnd
a component balanced allocation rule such that every strongly eﬃcient network is
in the largest consistent set or whether the LCS is contained in the set of strongly
eﬃcient networks. However, the question, we believe, is still open.
Now, note that the set of Pareto eﬃcient networks with respect to an allocation
rule is usually a superset of the set of strongly eﬃcient networks. Even then, the
LCS and the set of Pareto eﬃcient networks may be disjoint.
Proposition 3 There exists an environment of networks (with a component bal-
anced and anonymous allocation rule) such that the largest consistent set (with
respect to the value function and the allocation rule) does not contain any Pareto
eﬃcient network.
12Proof: Take the following environment which is a slight modiﬁcation of the one
given in the proof of Theorem 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
N = {1,2,3}.
For notational convenience we partition Z into the subsets C1 to C4 such that:
C1 = {{12,23,13}};
C2 = {g ∈ Z| g = {ij,jk}; i,j,k ∈ N};
C3 = {g ∈ Z| g = {ij}; i,j ∈ N};
C4 = {∅}.
Take the following value function:
v({12,23,13}) = 0;
for every g ∈ C2, v(g) = 1 + ǫ; where 0 < ǫ < 0.5.
for every i,j ∈ N, v({ij}) = 1,
v(∅) = 0.
Fix the component balanced and anonymous allocation rule Y as follows.
Y1({12,23,13},v) = Y2({12,23,13},v) = Y3({12,23,13},v) = 0,
for i,j,k ∈ N, Yi({ij,jk},v) = Yk({ij,jk},v) = 0.5, Yj({ij,jk},v) = ǫ;
for i,j,k ∈ N, Yi({ij},v) = Yj({ij},v) = 0.5; Yk({ij},v) = 0,
Yi(∅,v) = Yj(∅,v) = Yk(∅,v) = 0.
For every other value function, Y = Y CE. Note that given the value function and
the allocation rule, the set of Pareto eﬃcient networks is C2. However, routine
calculation (see Chwe (1994)) yields that the LCS for this environment is C3.
However, with Pareto eﬃciency, the incompatibility between socially optimal
networks and stable networks is less severe. In the proposition below we show that
there is at least one component balanced and anonymous allocation rule, namely
the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, that ensures that the set of Pareto
eﬃcient networks has a non-empty intersection with the LCS.
13Proposition 4 For every value function there exists a network that is Pareto
eﬃcient as well as an element in the LCS with respect to the component-wise egal-
itarian allocation rule Y CE.
Proof: Take some v ∈ V. If v is not component additive, then by the deﬁnition of
Y CE and Remark 1 we are done.
Now suppose v is component additive. The algorithm described below (this is
similar to an algorithm described in Jackson, 2005 (originally due to Banerjee,
1999) selects a network g that is Pareto eﬃcient with respect to Y CE as well as
an element in the LCS. First, we introduce a few pieces of notation. For S ⊆ N,
the set of components that can be formed by taking one or more players in S is
denoted by Z(S). By a(h) denote the average value of a network h. Also, recall
that by P(h) we denote the set of players who are linked in the component h.
The Algorithm:
Step 1: Set G1 := N. Let A1 = {h ∈ Z(G1)|a(h) ≥ a(h′) for all h′ ∈ Z(G1)}. Let
C1 ⊆ A1 be a subset of networks satisfying the properties:
a. For any h,h′ ∈ C1, P(h) ∩ P(h′) = ∅;
b. For every C′ ⊆ A1 for which it is true that for every h,h′ ∈ C′, P(h)∩P(h′) = ∅,
| ∪h∈C1 P(h)| ≥ | ∪h∈C′ P(h)|.
That is, in words, C1 is a collection of components such that each element in C1
has the highest average value. Additionally, among all such collections of maximal-
average-valued components, the components in C1 together connect the maximum
number of players.
Step m: Set Gm := N\ (∪h∈Cj;j∈{1,...,m−1}P(h)). Let Am = {h ∈ Z(Gm)|a(h) ≥
a(h′) for all h′ ∈ Z(Gm)}. Let Cm ⊆ Am be a subset of networks satisfying the
properties:
a. For any h,h′ ∈ Cm, P(h) ∩ P(h′) = ∅;
b. For every C′ ⊆ Am for which it is true that for every h,h′ ∈ C′, P(h)∩P(h′) = ∅,
14| ∪h∈Cm P(h)| ≥ | ∪h∈C′ P(h)|.
Since N is ﬁnite, this algorithm terminates in ﬁnitely many steps. Let a resulting
set of collections of components be {C1,...,Ck}. For j = 1,...,k, let Nj = {i ∈
N|i ∈ P(h) and h ∈ Cj}. Let the network g = ∪{h|h ∈ Cj for some j ∈ {1,...,k}}
We show below that g is Pareto eﬃcient with respect to Y CE and it is also in the
LCS with respect to Y CE.
Claim 1: g is Pareto eﬃcient with respect to Y CE.
Suppose g is not Pareto eﬃcient with respect to Y CE. This implies that there
exists g′ ∈ Z s.t. for all i ∈ N, Y CE
i (g′,v) ≥ Y CE
i (g,v) and for at least one j ∈ N,
Y CE
j (g′,v) > Y CE
j (g,v). Fix this j. First, note that Y CE
j (g′,v) must be greater than
0 (otherwise, the contradiction is immediate). Now suppose Y CE
i (g,v) = 0 for all
i ∈ N1. Then, again, the contradiction is immediate. Therefore, Y CE
i (g,v) > 0 for
all i ∈ N1. If j ∈ N1, then, again, by the deﬁnition of N1 (and the construction
of C1), the contradiction is immediate. Therefore, j / ∈ N1. Next we show that
Y CE
j (g′,v) < Y CE
i (g,v) for each i ∈ N1. Suppose not. Then this contradicts the
deﬁnition of C1. Now suppose Y CE
j (g′,v) > Y CE
i (g,v) for each i ∈ N2. Then, this
violates the deﬁnition of C2. Therefore, for each i ∈ N2, Y CE
j (g′,v) ≤ Y CE
i (g,v).
However, it must be true that Y CE
j (g′,v) < Y CE
i (g,v) for each i ∈ N2. Suppose
not. Then this contradicts the deﬁnition of C2. Proceeding in this way, we arrive
at a desired contradiction. Thus, the claim is proved.
Claim 2: g is in the LCS with respect to Y CE.
Suppose not. Then, by the Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994), there must exist g′ ∈ Z
such that g′ ≫ g. We would show that this is impossible. Let, if possible, a sequence
of enforcements by which this indirect domination occurs be the following:
g(= a1) →S1 a2 →S2 ... →Sm−1 am →Sm g
′,
where for each l ∈ {1,...,m}, Sl is a coalition, al is a network and a2  = a1 without
loss of generality. Clearly, under Y CE, S1 ∩ N1 = ∅ (otherwise, by the deﬁnition
15of C1, we would get a contradiction). Then, every component of a1 (i.e., g) from
the collection C1 also remains a component in a2. But then, S2 ∩ N1 = ∅. Us-
ing an identical argument recursively, we get that N1 ∩ (S1 ∪ ... ∪ Sm) = ∅ and
so, every component of g from the collection C1 also remains a component of g′.
Note that then, under Y CE, S1 ∩ N2 = ∅ (otherwise, by the deﬁnition of C2, we
would get a contradiction). Using the above argument recursively we ﬁnd that
Nj ∩(S1∪...∪Sm) = ∅ for every j = 1,...,k. This leads to a contradiction. Thus,
the claim is proved.
Next, we give a suﬃcient condition on the value functions which ensures that
there exists an allocation rule for which a strongly eﬃcient network is in the LCS.
Definition 4 (Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)) A value function v ∈
V is top-convex if some eﬃcient network also maximizes per-capita value among
individuals. Formally, let for coalition S, p(v,S) = maxg∈gSv(g)/|S|. The value
function is top-convex if p(v,N) ≥ p(v,S) for each coalition S.
We refer to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) for a discussion of top-
convexity.
Proposition 5 Suppose a value function v is top-convex. Then every strongly
eﬃcient network is in the LCS with respect to the component-wise egalitarian al-
location rule Y CE.
Proof: If v is not component additive, then by the deﬁnition of Y CE and Remark
1 we are done.
Suppose v is component additive and let g be a strongly eﬃcient non-empty net-
work. Then the per-capita value of every component of g is p(v,N) (by Jackson
and van den Nouweland (2001), section 4). Note that under Y CE the maximum
16pay-oﬀ that any i ∈ N can get in any network in Z is p(v,N). Now suppose g is
not in the LCS. Then, by Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994) there exists g′ in the LCS
such that g′ ≫ g. Also note that by top convexity, every i ∈ N is linked with some
j  = i in g. But then there cannot exist g′ such that g′ ≫ g.
Remark 3 The model studied in Dutta et al. (2005) diﬀers slightly from the
classical model of Jackson-Wolinsky. In the framework of Dutta et al. (2005) the
value of a component depends on the structure of the entire network and the value
of the whole network is necessarily the sum of the values of its components. How-
ever, the classical Jackson-Wolinsky model allows the value of the whole network
to diﬀer from the sum of the values of its component. As a result, in the model of
Dutta et al., component balance has bite even if the underlying value function is
not component additive. However, as can be easily seen, our impossibility results
(Propositions 1 and 3) are valid in their framework as well.
4 Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this paper is to look at the issue of incompatibility between
stability and eﬃciency in the environment of networks using perhaps the most
popular solution concept incorporating farsightedness.
Of course, there still remain a few obvious open questions (about which we have
remarked in the body of the paper) that emerge from this work which still remain
unanswered.
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5 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Before proceeding to the main body of the proof, for later use we note the following
fact in the form of a lemma.
Lemma Call a set Y ⊆ Z internally consistent if a ∈ Y implies the following:
∀(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ Y such that [e = d or e ≫ d] and
e  ≻S a. If Y ⊆ Z is internally consistent then Y ⊆ L.
Proof of the lemma: (from Chwe (1994)) Let Y ⊆ Z be internally consistent.
Deﬁne Λ := ∪{X ⊆ Z| X is internally consistent}. To prove the lemma, it suﬃces
to show that Λ is consistent. To prove this we need to show that a ∈ Z \Λ implies
that there exists (S,d) ∈ (2N ×Z) for which a →S d and for every e ∈ Λ such that
[e = d or e ≫ d], e ≻S a. Suppose not, i.e., let there exist a ∈ Z \ Λ for which the
19following is true:
∀(S, d) ∈ (2
N×Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ Λ such that [e = d or e ≫ d] and e   ≻Sa.
Then clearly, Λ∪{a} is internally consistent which violates the deﬁnition of Λ. So,
Y ⊆ Λ ⊆ L.
Now we proceed to the main body of the proof.
Proof of the Proposition 1: Take the following environment which is a slight
modiﬁcation of the one given in the proof of Theorem 2 in Dutta, Ghosal and Ray
(2005).
N = {1,2,3}. For notational convenience later, we partition Z into the subsets
C1 to C4 such that:
C1 = {{12,23,13}};
C2 = {g ∈ Z| g = {ij,jk}; i,j,k ∈ N};
C3 = {g ∈ Z| g = {ij}; i,j ∈ N};
C4 = {∅}.
Take the following value function:
v({12,23,13}) = 9;
for every g ∈ C2, v(g) = 0;
for every i,j ∈ N, v({ij}) = 8,
v(∅) = 0.
Fix any component balanced and anonymous allocation rule Y. Then, by compo-
nent balance and anonymity,
Y1({12,23,13},v) = Y2({12,23,13},v) = Y3({12,23,13},v) = 3,
for i,j,k ∈ N, Yi({ij,jk},v) = Yk({ij,jk},v) = c, Yj({ij,jk},v) = −2c, where c
is some real number;
for i,j,k ∈ N, Yi({ij},v) = Yj({ij},v) = 4; Yk({ij},v) = 0,
20Yi(∅,v) = Yj(∅,v) = Yk(∅,v) = 0.
Here the unique strongly eﬃcient network is {12,23,13}. However, below we show
that whatever the value of c, the LCS, L = {{12},{23},{13}}. We consider the
following three cases.
Case 1: c ≥ 4 :
First, we show that the set C3 is internally consistent. Therefore, we are to show
that a ∈ C3 implies the following: ∀(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ C3
such that [e = d or e ≫ d] and e  ≻S a. Take x ∈ C3 and let x = {ij}, i,j ∈ N.
Consider (S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) such that x →S d, d  = x. Then, by Deﬁnition 1,
S ∩ {i,j}  = ∅. If d ∈ C3, then set e = d. If d ∈ C1 ∪ C4 then consider the
enforcement d →{i,j} x and set e = x. Suppose d ∈ C2. Then d is either {lm,mk}
or {lk,km} where l,m ∈ {i,j},l  = m, k ∈ N \ {i,j}. In the former subcase
consider the enforcement d →{m} x and set e = x. In the latter subcase, consider
the enforcement d →{k} {lk} and set e = {lk}. Since x  i y and x  j y for every
y ∈ C3, we are done. Thus, we show that C3 is internally consistent and so, by
the lemma, C3 ⊆ L.
Next we prove that in fact, C3 = L. Suppose not and let some L ⊃ C3 be the
LCS. First, we claim that L∩C2 = ∅. Take some x (= {ij,jk}) ∈ C2, i,j,k ∈ N.
Consider the enforcement relation x →{j} {ij}. Then {ij}≻jx. Moreover, since
y≻jx for every y ∈ Z \{x}, it follows that there does not exist any e ∈ L such that
[e = {ij} or e ≫ {ij} and e  ≻j x]. Thus, the claim is proved. Next, consider x
from C1∪C4 and the enforcement relation x →{1,2} {12}. Note that for any (S,y)
∈ (2N × Z) such that y  = {12}, {12} →S y implies that S ∩ {1,2}  = ∅. Moreover,
for every e ∈ Z \ C2, {12}  1 e and {12}  2 e. Therefore, there does not exist
e ∈ L such that e ≫ {12}. Since {12}≻{1,2}x, x / ∈ L.
Case 2: −2 < c < 4 :
21Note that in this case, for i,j ∈ N, {ij}≻{i,j}g for every g ∈ Z \ C3 and also, for
any g ∈ Z, {ij}  i g and {ij}  j g. In this case also, C3 is internally consistent,
i.e., a ∈ C3 implies the following: ∀(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ C3
such that [e = d or e ≫ d] and e  ≻S a. For proving this, take x ∈ C3 and let
x = {ij}, i,j ∈ N. Consider (S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) such that x →S d and d  = x.
By Deﬁnition 1, S ∩ {i,j}  = ∅. If d ∈ C3, then set e = d. If d ∈ Z \ C3 then
consider the enforcement d →{i,j} x and set e = x. Since x  i y and x  j y for
every y ∈ C3, we are done. Therefore, by the lemma, C3 ⊆ L.
In this case also, L = C3. To see this, take x ∈ Z \ C3 and consider the en-
forcement relation x →{1,2} {12}. Note that for any (S,y) ∈ (2N × Z), y  = {12},
{12} →S y implies that S ∩{1,2}  = ∅. As noted above, for every e ∈ Z, {12}  1 e
and {12}  2 e. Therefore, there does not exist e ∈ L such that e ≫ {12}. Since
{12}≻{1,2}x, x / ∈ L.
Case 3: c ≤ −2 :
Again, ﬁrst we show that C3 is internally consistent, i.e., we show that a ∈ C3
implies the following: ∀(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) for which a →S d, ∃ e ∈ C3 such that
[e = d or e ≫ d] and e  ≻S a. Take x ∈ C3 and let x = {ij}, i,j ∈ N. Consider
(S,d) ∈ (2N × Z) such that x →S d and d  = x. By Deﬁnition 1, S ∩ {i,j}  = ∅. If
d ∈ C3, then set e = d. If d ∈ C1∪C4 then consider the enforcement d →{i,j} x and
set e = x. Suppose d ∈ C2. Then, d is either {lm,mk} or {lk,km} where l,m ∈
{i,j},l  = m and k ∈ N \ {i,j}. In the former subcase consider the enforcement
d →{l,k} {lk} and set e = {lk}. In the latter subcase, consider the enforcement
d →{i,j} {ij} and set e = {ij}. Since x  i y and x  j y for every y ∈ C3, we are
done. Therefore, C3 is internally consistent and so, C3 ⊆ L.
Next we prove that once again, in this case also, L = C3. Suppose not and let
some L ⊃ C3 be the LCS. To begin with, we claim that L ∩ C2 = ∅. Take some
x (= {ij,jk}) ∈ C2, i,j,k ∈ N. Consider the enforcement relation x →{i,k} {ik}.
22Suppose, there exists e ∈ L such that e ≫ {ik}. We show below that this is
impossible. Let, if possible, a sequence of enforcements by which this indirect
domination occurs be the following:
{ik}(= a1) →S1 a2 →S2 ... →Sm−1 am →Sm e,
where for each l ∈ {1,...,m}, Sl is a coalition, al is a network and a2  = a1 without
loss of generality. Then, by the deﬁnition of enforcement relation, S1 ∩ {i,k}  = ∅.
We consider two subcases. First take the subcase where c < −2. Since S1∩{i,k}  =
∅ and e≻S1{ik}, e must be either {ji,ik} or {jk,ki}. Therefore, by the deﬁnition
of enforcement relation, j ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {1,...,m} and by the deﬁnition
of indirect domination, e≻Slal. But this is impossible because, for every g ∈ Z,
g  j {ji,ik} and g  j {jk,ki}. Next, take the subcase where c = −2. Then,
{ik}  i g and {ik}  k g for every g ∈ Z. Therefore, for this subcase also, there
cannot exist e ∈ Z such that e ≫ {ik}. Since {ik}≻{i,k}{ij,jk}, {ij,jk} / ∈ L.
Thus, the claim is proved.
Next, take any x ∈ C1∪C4 and consider the enforcement relation x →{1,2} {12}.
Note that for any (S,y) ∈ (2N × Z) such that y  = {12}, {12} →S y implies that
S∩{1,2}  = ∅. By the claim above, L∩C2 = ∅ and for every e ∈ Z\C2, {12}  1 e
and {12}  2 e. Therefore, there does not exist e ∈ L such that e ≫ {12}. Since
{12}≻{1,2}x, x / ∈ L.
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